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PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: WHO'S THE ROGUE?
"A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction…against the United States…shall be punished by death…"
United States Code, Title 18, Section 2332a
In 1945 representatives of 51 countries met in San Francisco to draft the charter of the United Nations. In the 20 th century the world had suffered the cataclysmic impact of two world wars including over 50 million deaths in World War II alone. The drafters of the UN Charter were determined to control the scourge of state versus state aggression that seemed to be the core of 20 th century warfare. They enacted a sweeping ban on the use of force as a lawful instrument of national policy (Article 2(4)) 1 with a limited exception for self-defense in the case of an armed attack upon a member nation's territory (Article 51).
2 Force was also allowed in UN authorized enforcement actions. 3 The drafters did not address non-state terrorist organizations or weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Prior to enactment of the UN Charter, customary international law allowed a nation threatened with imminent attack to take preemptive action to remove the threat. Over the years, legal scholars and commentators have hotly debated whether this customary right to national self-defense exists independently of the apparently narrower rule contained in Article 51.
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, a growing body of state practice indicates that in cases of imminent threat, the right of a nation to strike preemptively enjoys wide acceptance.
Some authors have suggested that Article 51 itself has been preempted by state practice that has created a new body of customary legal norms. 4 Other commentators, writing since the September 11 terrorist attacks argue that the United States and the Bush administration are facing challenges in the post-cold war world that are far different than those the international legal system was designed to meet. They believe the system must adapt or be rendered irrelevant. "The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
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The recently issued National Military Strategy of the United States also recognizes the right and intention of the United States to strike preemptively, albeit using slightly more circumspect rhetoric than the National Security Strategy.
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This paper will analyze the legality of the U.S. policy of preemptive strike and its implications for the development of international legal norms. It will also discuss the circumstances under which the US might or should use preemption and the likely legal and policy consequences of improper application of the doctrine. As a framework for analysis, the paper will discuss the development of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense and consider Finally, it will propose a six-pronged test to justify preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE.
Anticipatory self-defense is the doctrine which allows a threatened state to strike first and eliminate the threat before it's attacked. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch legal scholar and widely acknowledged father of international law is credited with the early development of the doctrine.
In 1625, he wrote the seminal work on international law entitled The Law of War and Peace. 20 An article seeking to recognize and preserve an inherent right would not be used as the mechanism to eviscerate that very right. It is much more logical to conclude that the use of the term "if an armed attack occurs" shows the drafter's views as to the most likely case for self-defense, but not the only one.
Having established that the customary right to self-defense continues to exist, it is useful to flesh out the concept with some historical examples. As will be evident, the requirements under the historical norms are strict and cannot be used as an excuse for aggression.
Essentially every military action undertaken since World War II has been justified as selfdefense. Where does self-defense end and aggression begin? Each use of a preemptive strike must meet the three-pronged test of necessity, imminence, and proportionality.
PREEMPTIVE STRIKE CASE STUDIES
JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese conducted a surprise carrier-borne air strike on the It is unclear whether the Japanese government formally considered the requirements of customary international law before attacking Pearl Harbor, but it is clear that they felt they had no choice but to go to war with the United States. Japan was a resource poor island nation The Japanese government knew they were a much less powerful country than the United States. By late 1941 they had only six months of reserve oil remaining. They could easily seize large oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies, but such overt aggression would likely provoke war with the United States. 23 Withdrawal from Manchuria and the abandonment of four years of gains was equivalent to national surrender and was not an option for the militaristic government. War with the US was inevitable. To the Japanese, the United States had blocked their national aims at empire, threatened them with economic ruin and starvation with its oil embargo, and moved the Pacific Fleet into the mid-Pacific as a clear threat. They had little hope in winning a total war with the US, but their best chance lay in crippling the Pacific Fleet in a surprise strike that would allow them to seize resources and build up defenses so strong that the US would agree to peace terms maintaining the status quo. 24 Despite this reasoning, the attack on Pearl Harbor fails to meet any of the three prongs necessary for the valid exercise of self-defense under customary international law.
Necessity. The Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor was not necessary because they could have resolved the dispute peacefully. Had they withdrawn their forces from Manchuria or showed any willingness to reach a settlement, the US was prepared to resume oil shipments.
That the Japanese were unwilling to give up their illegal war of aggression in Manchuria does not make a preemptive strike to support the illegal war valid or necessary under customary international law. In fact, the US actions were justified as reasonable acts of collective defense with China, a US ally.
Imminence. The US was at peace with Japan and had no plans to initiate hostilities.
The Japanese did not believe that a US military attack was contemplated. They feared the US Pacific Fleet's advanced basing at Pearl Harbor only as a threat if they began active military operations in the Dutch East Indies or elsewhere in the Pacific. Ironically, the US moved the fleet to Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japan's aggressive expansion, 25 but Japan viewed it as a threat to be eliminated. This is an example of a failed deterrence strategy that made the use of force more likely. This lesson has relevance for President Bush's announced strategy of preemption and will be revisited later in this paper.
Proportionality. Even assuming that the US posed an imminent threat to Japan, the attack on Pearl Harbor was not a proportionate response. Attempting to destroy an entire fleet using hundreds of strike aircraft and killing thousands of people is far out of proportion to the economic and diplomatic pressure the United States placed on Japan in an effort to contain their aggression in Manchuria.
Japan's actions at Pearl Harbor were a classic case of an illegal preemptive strike. They galvanized US and world opinion against the Japanese and filled the United States with an unshakable resolve to pursue the war against Japan to total surrender. Japan ensured its destruction and untold misery for its population by pursuing the preemptive attack.
ISRAELI ATTACK ON EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN IN 1967.
In June 1967, Israel preemptively attacked and destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, followed shortly by the air forces of Syria and Jordan. In a six day lightning ground campaign the Israeli Defense Forces captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Jordanian controlled sections of Jerusalem. Because
Israel was a small country lacking strategic depth (only 40 miles wide at its narrowest point) the use of preemptive strikes was a widely publicized part of Israeli national security strategy.
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Although a preemptive strike was expected by Egypt, Israel was able to achieve surprise through exhaustive planning and effective deception.
In the United Nations, Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban declared that Israel had invoked the provisions of Article 51 permitting member states to act in self-defense. 27 The Israeli action was denounced in the UN as illegal aggression, 28 yet the debate was much influenced by cold war politics since Egypt and Syria were strongly allied with The Soviet Union and Israel was backed by the United States. 29 Analyzed dispassionately under the three-pronged customary international law norm the attack was valid.
Necessity. In the months preceding the 1967 war the anti-Israel rhetoric by Arab leaders, particularly Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser, intensified dramatically.
President Nasser openly called for the destruction of Israel through armed attack. 30 He formed a unified command of Arab military units aimed at achieving overwhelming superiority. He closed the straights of Tiran to Israeli cargo. Finally, he ordered the UN Sinai peacekeepers to leave on 24 hours notice 31 and moved a strong Egyptian armored force into the Sinai within striking distance of Israel. Given its lack of strategic depth, the clear threat to its national survival, and the exceedingly low probability of achieving a peaceful settlement, Israel was justified in believing its preemptive action was necessary.
Imminence. The escalated anti-Israeli rhetoric, the summary removal of UN peacekeepers, the closing of the Straits of Tiran, and the positioning of strong Egyptian forces in the Sinai justified Israel in concluding that armed attack on three fronts was imminent. Imminence. This part of the three prong test is the most difficult for Israel to meet.
Proportionality
Most members of the world community in 1981 felt that the threat to Israel by the Iraqi Osirak facility was speculative. 38 It was not clear that Iraq would be able to produce weapons grade nuclear material at the site, produce functioning weapons, and properly deliver them. Even if they could do these things the threat would be well in the future and certainly not imminent.
Israel countered that the plant was within three months of becoming operational, at which time an attack would be inconceivable because of the potential catastrophic impact to Baghdad from radiation released from the destroyed site. In effect, Israel made the novel argument that complying with the proportionality prong of the Caroline doctrine forced it to attack immediately.
Proportionality. Israel went to great lengths to minimize collateral damage and casualties. The F-16 was chosen as the strike aircraft because it had the most advanced bomb guidance system available. The air strike was highly precise and the reactor building was the only structure damaged. No radiation was released and only one person was killed. The Israeli response was narrowly tailored to address the threat posed.
The Osirak attack was almost universally condemned by the international community, weapons has ever fought a conventional war against another nuclear power.
UNITED STATES ATTACK ON LIBYA IN 1986 (OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON).
During the early morning hours of 14 April 1986, United States Air Force F-111 aircraft flying from bases in England and US Navy A-6 bombers operating from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean bombed six targets in Libya. 41 The raid lasted 11 minutes and killed approximately 100 Libyans. One of the targets bombed was the Aziziyah Barracks where Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gadaffi and his family lived. Several bombs struck Gadaffi's house including one which landed immediately outside his front door. 42 Gadaffi was emotionally shaken but uninjured. His 16 month old adopted daughter was killed and two of his sons wounded.
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The raid followed a period of heightened tension between Libya and the United States culminating in the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque on 5 April 1986 that killed two Necessity. The US theory was that the raid on Libya was necessary to deter and prevent future terrorist incidents sponsored by Colonel Gadaffi. The bombing of Gadaffi's living quarters during normal sleeping hours indicates that a regime change was an important goal of the attack as well.
Imminence. The Libyan attacks may be closer to a reprisal under international law than to anticipatory self-defense because the discotheque bombing occurred prior to the attack.
Many writers argue that International law does not permit the use of force for reprisal or retaliation. 46 Still, the US was justified in feeling that unless strong action was taken to punish Gadaffi other Libyan terrorist acts were imminent.
Proportionality. The raid was a limited response to the premeditated bombing of an establishment known to be heavily frequented by US soldiers. The attack was planned to minimize civilian casualties by using precision guided munitions. The attack was narrowly tailored to send a message to the Libyan leadership and to other nations that the US would not tolerate further Libyan sponsored terrorist acts.
Operation El Dorado Canyon is a significant case in the development of anticipatory selfdefense because it set the precedent of using limited force to prevent future attacks following a state sponsored terrorist incident. 47 It also set the precedent for treating a terrorist incident Imminence. Like Operation El Dorado Canyon, the US strikes against al Qaeda in 1998
occurred in response to a terrorist attack and was justified under a self-defense theory of preventing future attacks. There were significant elements of reprisal and retaliation as well.
The United States was involved in a continuing struggle with a well-organized terrorist group that engaged in a series of attacks against US citizens and interests. Bin Laden openly Although characterized by the then ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan as "Killing a fly with a cannon" 53 the US attacks met the standards of customary international law for proportionality.
The US attacks met with criticism from legal scholars complaining about the expansion of the self-defense doctrine but with remarkably little opposition from the international community. 54 Customary international law was expanding to allow proportional attacks against terrorist groups operating from safe haven sanctuary in rogue states.
CONCLUSIONS FROM CASE STUDIES.
The results of the case studies are summarized in 
THE 2002 UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE ON PREEMPTIVE FORCE.
"No advance in the art of legal drafting can bridge the enormous gulf that divides the international community over what constitutes acceptable use of force."
55
Michael J. Glennon
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As stunned observers watched the World Trade Center collapsing into smoky ruin few realized they were also witnessing the final collapse of the United Nations' use of force regime.
Already weakened by post cold war pressures unimaginable to the drafters of the UN Charter, including weapons of mass destruction proliferation, widespread ethnic cleansing, and global terrorism of apocalyptic dimensions, the September 11 attacks prompted the Bush administration to reject the conservative UN interpretation of the use of force in self defense.
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The US would not rely on cold war deterrence and reserved the right to strike preemptively against rogue states and terrorist groups even where the US could not demonstrate an imminent threat. 58 The Bush Doctrine contains six essential arguments:
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• The United States cannot rely on deterrence against risk tolerant rogue states and terrorist groups that are unmoved by mass casualties.
• Weapons of mass destruction are weapons of first choice--not last resort for rogue states and terrorist groups seeking to counter US conventional superiority.
• There is an overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that seek WMD.
• There is no distinction between terrorist groups and states that harbor them.
• Traditional international legal norms such as the requirement of imminent threat must be adapted to the realities of new threats and enemies.
• The risk of inaction is so great (there are no adequate defenses) that the US will act preemptively as it sees fit.
The National Security Strategy does not give even passing mention to the Charter of the 
RISKS OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE.
The primary risk of the Bush Doctrine is in its aggressive application to rogue states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction where the United States cannot show an imminent threat. Preemptive strikes lack legitimacy to the world community and risk isolating the US in an increasingly hostile international environment. Some have described this prospect as the US becoming a "lonely hegemon." 65 The US policy might provoke a backlash effect where nations band together to confront and contain aggressive American policy.
As the largest global economy, the US has a vital interest in ensuring international order and trading stability. • "has developed the capability of inflicting substantial harm upon another,
• [has] indicated explicitly or implicitly its willingness or intent to do so,
• to all appearances is only waiting for the opportunity to strike."
This test is a valid attempt to grapple with the problem of applying the Caroline doctrine to weapons of mass destruction, but falls far short. First, Professor Glennon's test only deals with nations that have already developed a weapons of mass destruction capability. It does not address a rogue nation seeking to develop such weapons. Second, the "waiting for the opportunity to strike" standard appears to be the Caroline imminence requirement rewritten, which the Bush administration has rejected. Finally, the test does not require proportionality in the response, a basic principle of international law. Something more is needed to decide when a nation may invoke anticipatory self-defense to attack a rogue state's weapons of mass destruction capability.
I propose a more useful test. A preemptive strike against weapons of mass destruction is justified where a state:
• has disregarded clearly established customary international norms or treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, used weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations, deceived the international community about its possession of weapons of mass destruction, or supported or sponsored terrorism, and
• has developed a credible weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver them or has substantially advanced programs to develop these capabilities (operational within two years), and
• has rejected demands by the international community, the United Nations, or the target state to remove the weapons, or cease their development under international supervision, and
• has indicated explicitly or implicitly its willingness or intent to use weapons of mass destruction [from Professor Glennon's test], and
• a target state reasonably believes that its national survival or essential way of life is at grave risk from the threat of weapons of mass destruction attack within two years, and
• any preventive action taken by a target state is proportional to the harm to be prevented, uses the minimum degree of force necessary to remove the threat, and minimizes civilian casualties and property destruction. To avoid these problems, this paper proposes a six-pronged modification of customary international law for dealing with preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The test allows proportional strikes against rogue states posing grave threats to the national survival of target states after notice and refusal to remove the weapons. This test could become the basis for a new norm of customary international law that restores consensus in the international community, safeguards nations from weapons of mass destruction, and preserves American moral leadership.
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